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The chapter sets out to identify ways in which the dominant pedagogy in the 
west has been shaped and influenced by instrumentalist imperatives emanating 
from the high age of logical positivism. It will furthermore expose the harm that has 
been done to education as a result, limitations on learning that are most apparent 
with the insights of updated sciences. The chapter will propose a values approach 
to pedagogy as a way of countering the narrow bounds of instrumentalism with 
an approach that possesses greater potential to address the whole person and the 
full range of human development measures, including personal, social, emotional, 
moral, spiritual and academic learning. The chapter will utilize international 
research that supports the beneficial claims of values pedagogy, with special refer-
ence to data from the Australian Values Education Program.
Keywords: values, values education, pedagogical approaches, curricular approaches, 
pedagogical leadership, holistic education, Australian education
1. Introduction
Ayer’s [1] logical positivism had tried to ground all authentic knowing in the 
rational or empirically observable and/or measurable. Other than the “truths” con-
tained in mathematics and logic, all other truth or assured knowledge claims were to be 
restricted to what could be empirically verified according to the so-called “Verification 
Principle” emanating from an eminent group of European philosophers known as the 
Vienna Circle [2]. The Verification Principle and its spawning in logical positivism were 
effectively outgrowths of nineteenth-century thinking resulting largely from concep-
tions of scientific method and supposedly assured scientific knowing held at the time.
During the nineteenth century and persisting well into the twentieth and even 
twenty-first centuries, scientific knowledge was believed to rest entirely on empiri-
cal methodology and so all human pursuits interested in knowledge were to follow 
suit. Among the human science disciplines, psychology and sociology developed 
in this way and, especially granted their influence on education, it was predictable 
that it would reflect these beliefs as well. Hence, as a highly influential influence, 
we find Tyler [3] generating a virtual empirical science around assessment regimes 
which, in the spirit of “teaching to the test,” inevitably determined the direction of 
pedagogy. Bloom and associates [4, 5] built further on such thinking in the form 
of the taxonomies of educational objectives and their appropriate assessment 
regimes; these taxonomies drove generations of educational thinking, in turn also 
influencing the ways in which the principles and practice of pedagogy were enacted 
in schools. Thus, the foundations for instrumentalism in education were being well 
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set in place, with associated pedagogical assumptions and practice unrelenting 
regardless of masses of evidence of the damage that can be done by them to effica-
cious learning, not to mention that their own foundations in scientific thinking have 
come under increasing scrutiny. These claims will be substantiated in what follows 
and the terms of a values pedagogical alternative will be outlined and justified 
by reference to international research, especially in the data and findings of the 
Australian Values Education Program.
2. Countering positivism
Wittgenstein [6], in his famous work, Philosophical Investigations, refers to “real-
ity” and the “facts” thereof as part of what he calls “language games.” The gist is that 
the locus of human knowing is contained in language rather than empirically verifi-
able data. It was a subtle yet fundamental under-cutting of the basis of logical posi-
tivism and nineteenth century thinking about empiricism as the basis of all knowing. 
Ferre [7], in this regard, bespeaks a clear Wittgensteinian perspective in declaring 
that “facts are never given in isolation from the minds that receive them” (p. 761). 
Ferre implied that the things we call “facts” or verifiable data are really theories in the 
minds of the subjects who perceive them, and hence are less observable or least of all 
measurable than in the ways that logical positivists held to be determinative.
Such rejoinders were further reinforced by Lakatos [8] and Kuhn [9] who coined 
the notions of “touchstone” and “paradigm” respectively to connote the true basis 
of claims to “know.” According to their theories, knowing is not merely a linear 
conforming of perception and reality, as the logical positivist would have it. It is not 
objective in the simple observable or measurable sense because it is infused with the 
subjectivity of the person doing the knowing. Quine [10] went on to show just how 
subjective were the assertions of those empiricists claiming to be objective: indeed, 
the Verification Principle itself defied the very rules which formed it in that it 
belonged to neither category of mathematics and logic nor of the empirically verifi-
able. Feyerabend [11] launched highly critical attacks on the ways in which educa-
tion systems had applied logical positivist and/or simple empirical assumptions to 
curriculum and pedagogy, especially in the ways they had prioritized certain forms 
of knowledge over others, on the purported basis that they offered surer knowing 
(read the empirically verifiable knowing of science and technology mainly), while 
other forms of knowledge were relegated to the margins if not right out of educa-
tion. See also Apple [12] on “high status knowledge” and the damage that such 
conceptions have done to the balanced curriculum and holistic learning.
The “certain forms of knowledge” to which Feyerabend refers is further enlight-
ened in Habermas’s [13, 14] “ways of knowing” theory. Habermas’s explanation 
for apparently different forms of knowledge derives from his belief that knowing 
is impelled by a series of “cognitive interests,” three interests which are effectively 
part of the way the human mind works. First, there is an interest in technical control 
which impels an “empirical-analytic” way of knowing. This is useful knowledge for 
performing fairly basic tasks of being able to put something together, find a place 
on a map, operate a machine, or for competence in the fundamentals of literacy 
and numeracy. Second, the interest in understanding meanings gives rise to an 
 “historical-hermeneutic” way of knowing, the knowing that results largely from 
engagement, interrelationship and dialogue with others. This is a knowing that wants 
to get behind basic knowing to interpret what it might mean, for example, to under-
stand the importance of what is being put together, the significance of the place on 
the map, the ramifications and potential impact of the machine’s operations, and 
the full effects of literacy and numeracy, including their cultural significance and 
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differences. While empirical-analytic knowing does not require human interaction 
nor much in the way of imagination, historical-hermeneutic knowing requires both.
Third, there is an interest in being emancipated, a free agent as it were, which 
issues in a “critical” or “self-reflectivity” way of knowing, the knowledge that comes 
ultimately from knowing oneself. This is the knowing that causes us to reflect criti-
cally on our subject matter, our sources and ultimately ourselves as agents of know-
ing. Such agency impels us to go to any lengths to be assured that what we know is, as 
far as is possible, the unfettered truth, free of cultural bias and partial interpretation, 
including as those might function in ourselves. For Habermas, this way of knowing 
provides for the only truly assured, totally comprehensive and authentic human 
knowing. It is a deeply moral knowing in that it drives fearlessly beyond the politically 
correct or skewed, the safe, and the partisan interested, including as these blind spots 
play out in oneself. It requires profound forms of human encounter and ultimately 
of self-knowledge. It also requires much in the way of imagination. Habermasian 
literature, primary and secondary, is replete with the notion of imagination as a 
prerequisite for knowing of the fullest kind. Indeed, against both modernism’s 
and especially post-modernism’s unimaginative conceptions of the Enlightenment 
project, he proffers that what they have robbed us of is “… the spontaneous powers of 
imagination, of self-experience and of emotionality.” ([15], p. 13) For Habermas, this 
is an aberration of what the Enlightenment project was intended to do [16, 17].
In this work, Habermas illustrates well, among other things, the limitations of 
logical positivism’s conception of knowing and all it has led to, the limitations being 
set essentially around a knowing of basics, a knowing he describes as empirical-
analytic, useful for certain basic knowledge and skills but a long way from the 
full reaches of knowing. It is an especially long way from the more sophisticated 
knowing related to interpretations and meanings, and the more moral knowing that 
entails deep human encounters and, finally, a ruthless self-knowing, all of which 
require deep levels of imagination and emotionality. Seeing it this way helps to 
understand why Feyerabend was so critical of education that prioritized more basic 
knowing to the exclusion of holistic knowing.
3. Changing understandings of science
Even as the terms of nineteenth century positivism were being laid, such as 
bespoken in the Verification Principle, so the critique was underway, a critique that, 
from Habermas’s point of view, has not been taken seriously and from Feyerabend’s 
view, has impacted negatively on education. For Habermas, knowing required a for-
tified hermeneutic dimension which ultimately could lead to the more sophisticated 
knowing connoted in being an agent of knowing, in his sense. Habermas [15] is 
quite explicit that, for him, his thinking here owes much to Husserlian philosophy. 
Husserl [18] was a nineteenth century empiricist who saw even then the limitations 
of the narrower assumptions and functioning of a simple understanding of empiri-
cism, ones that emanated from the Verification Principle and became the basis of 
logical positivism. He described this kind of empiricism as “descriptive science,” 
fundamentally the same conception as to be found in Habermas’s empirical-analytic 
knowing, the knowing of basic facts and figures, purely descriptive knowing.
While a useful foundation for scientific knowing, for Husserl, it lacked the more 
important and essential human knowing that was the product of what he referred to 
as “eidetic science,” the knowing and understanding of meanings, of different per-
ceptions that can only be unraveled by human beings interacting and by deep forms 
of reflective learning. Eidetic science was heavily subjective and that was the very 
thing that was being in a sense forbidden by the obsession with descriptive science, 
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creating in turn an inherent obstacle to deeper forms of learning. For Husserl, 
human sciences had to include a human element and yet that was being denied to 
them by the scientific assumptions of the day. The irony herein was that knowledge 
of the deeper kind was being blocked in the name of a science purporting to be the 
means of all knowing. The same irony is reflected in both Habermasian epistemol-
ogy and Feyerabend’s and Apple’s reflections on what was ensuing in education. 
In the name of sound education, sound education was being denied. So what are 
the assumptions that led to this anomaly and how can they be broken down and 
re-formed in the interests of truly sound education? Well, the path and history of 
science itself, the very discipline that is purported to lie at the foundations of the 
assumptions, are instructive in this regard. The two exemplars by which I choose to 
make that point are the sciences of astrophysics and neuroscience.
3.1 Astrophysics
For Husserl, truth was best understood as ever elusive, rather than easily grasped 
in the way of simple empiricism, and so the truth seeker had to proceed with cau-
tion. Good science was a humble rather than arrogant methodology around alleged 
“certainties” that the tenets of descriptive science had led to. Good science was 
replete with imagination. Husserl’s caution about science is interestingly prophetic 
when one considers the far greater caution detected in much modern science, such 
as astrophysics, for instance. Against all the alleged certainties premised by earlier 
empirically bound method, we find find de Grasse Tyson [19] referring to dark 
energy and dark matter as a “mysterious presence,” constituting 96% or so of the 
known universe, responsible for maintaining it the way it is, yet about which we 
are “clueless.” He describes dark matter as our “frenemy,” part friend, part enemy: 
“We have no clue what it is. It is kind of annoying. But we desperately need it in our 
calculations to arrive at an accurate description of the universe.” (p. 62).
De Grasse Tyson speaks frequently about the need for high levels of cogni-
tive imagination for modern astrophysics to proceed. He underlines this point by 
reference to Albert Einstein, fairly unarguably the greatest scientist to ever live, yet 
one not given at all to simple empiricism or to being limited by Husserl’s notion of 
descriptive science. He says of Einstein that he “… hardly ever set foot in the labora-
tory; he did not test phenomena or use elaborate equipment. He was a theorist who 
perfected the “thought experiment,” in which you engage nature through your 
imagination” (p. 62). De Grasse Tyson refers to the book, titled, 100 scientists against 
Einstein [20] showing how these mainly simple empiricists (Husserl’s descriptive 
scientists) were wrong and Einstein’s imaginative methods (Husserl’s archetypal 
eidetic scientist) were ultimately proved correct. As examples of the limitations of 
their simple empiricism, some of Einstein’s critics described as “fantasy” the notion 
of the so-called “cosmic constant,” the central tenet in his theory of relativity. In 
fact, the “cosmic constant” was finally ratified with a measure of empirical evidence 
in 1998 [21], something further demonstrated by the famous 2016 gravitational 
wave detected by the Hadron Collider [22] and to an extent ratified even further by 
the famous and ground-breaking picture of the black hole in 2019 [23].
Einstein’s knowing was finally endorsed by highly sophisticated forms of empiri-
cism but the basis and impulsion of his knowing came not from empirical method 
but from what I refer to as imaginative method. On the other hand, the reliance 
on a simple empiricism on the part of the 100 adversarial scientists blinded them, 
while Einstein’s on imagination released him to speculate on realities that were quite 
beyond empirical verification of the kind most scientists of the day were relying on. In 
Husserlian terms, it illustrates the reliance for holistic knowing purposes on descrip-
tive and eidetic sciences intersecting and interacting. In Habermasian terms, the 100 
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scientists’ cognitive interest was in control, where Einstein’s was in imaginative explo-
ration of the kind that characterizes the true agent of knowing. He wanted to know the 
truth and to get there he had to go beyond the bounds of controlled knowing. There 
is a lesson here for all learning ventures, including school-based pedagogy. Over-
controlling of the knowledge process in the form of endless measuring of outcomes, 
accountability and assorted forms of instrumentalism can actually create blind spots 
and retard knowing of the most important kinds. On the other hand, releasing and 
nurturing the imagination might well be the most useful thing that schools can do.
3.2 Neuroscience
Updated neuroscience is another science that, in many ways, takes us to the 
same place. Damasio [24] and Immordino-Yang [25] refer to the enriched cognitive 
functioning, especially around imagination that ensues when discourse of any kind 
takes account of emotionality and sociality. In reference specifically to school-based 
discourse, Damasio and Immordino-Yang [26] have this to say:
Modern biology reveals humans to be fundamentally emotional and social 
creatures. And yet those of us in the field of education often fail to consider that the 
high-level cognitive skills taught in schools, including reasoning, decision making, 
and processes related to language, reading, and mathematics, do not function as 
rational, disembodied systems, somehow influenced by but detached from emotion 
and the body. (p. 3)
Narvaez [27–30] builds on these ideas, both as a neuropsychologist and educa-
tor, in the ways she positions imagination as the confidence-builder and architect 
of the mindset essential to what she refers to as “efficacious learning.” She ties 
imagination, emotion and cognition together in suggesting that it is imagination 
that unlocks the emotions that are needed for sound reasoning. In a word, reasoning 
is both rational and emotional. The mind thinks both logically and emotionally.
Narvaez focusses much on the ways in which human knowing has worked over 
the millennia of human existence, a process that in a sense is repeated each time a 
new life comes into the world. Among her specialities is early childhood education 
where imagination is the key or, if not stimulated, it is the death of efficacious learn-
ing. Yet, in the face of any amount of evidence, including in the different ways in 
which the scientific base of instrumentalist pedagogy is changing, instrumentalism 
in pedagogy and education generally seems to be the standard modus operandi of 
educational systems. The desire for accountability, invariably motivated by political 
agendas, including of control, rather than inspired by educational theory, drives sys-
tems towards the most easily measurable, invariably the basics, Habermas’s empiri-
cal-analytic knowing, Husserl’s descriptive science, Damasio’s and Immordino-Yang’s 
disembodied systems. When this drive becomes an obsession, affecting individual 
schools’ reputations, the key performance indicators of school administrators, the 
political slogans of governments and oppositions, the “be all and end all” of ranking 
in international testing, then the casualty is imaginative pedagogy and its associated 
efficacious learning. Let me offer one example of this, an example from Australia.
4. Instrumentalist pedagogy alive and well
NAPLAN (National Assessment Program Literacy and Numeracy) was estab-
lished by the Australian Government in 2008. It is a national literacy and numeracy 
testing mechanism administered at four levels across primary and secondary 
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education. It is mandatory for any school wishing to maintain government registra-
tion. Its results are inserted into a software program called “My School” (compris-
ing a large data set about each school’s numbers, demographics and, once imported, 
NAPLAN test results). This import was designed to show which schools were doing 
well in literacy and numeracy and which were not. It quickly became a ready-ref-
erence for parents in their school selection, a serious reputational issue for schools 
and a crucial KPI (key performance indicator) for school administrators.
NAPLAN had two main stated purposes: first, it was to strengthen literacy and 
numeracy levels of Australia’s young people; second, it was to improve Australia’s 
standing in the OECD international testing mechanism, PISA (Program for 
International Student Assessment). Evidence suggested, after 10 years, that there was 
no indication that either objective had been achieved in any substantial way. According 
to one study that typified the national result, literacy and numeracy levels had not 
improved, at least according to the limited NAPLAN device itself [31]. Additionally, 
Australia’s standing in PISA was demonstrably worse than before NAPLAN began [32].
At the time of writing, there is a strong push coming from powerful education 
entities, bureaucracies, teacher unions and teachers themselves that NAPLAN has 
so skewed the imperatives of education that it constitutes a menace to efficacious 
learning. Furthermore, research evaluations of the mechanism testify that it has “… 
a narrow focus on a limited set of skills rather than developing capacity…” The same 
research identified the following problems:
• the NAPLAN tests added little to teachers’ understanding of students’ literacy levels;
• the assessment was a poor measure of student achievement;
• the tests had little relation to students’ lives, or to their future job prospects;
• pressure to prepare students for NAPLAN detracted from other learning 
opportunities;
• stress around the inflated importance of the test negatively impacted some students’ 
wellbeing;
• pressure to “teach to the test” frustrated many teachers, reducing their sense of 
professional autonomy [33].
Meanwhile, an international testing expert declared NAPLAN to be “bizarre” 
in its inappropriateness. It is directed at all the wrong kind of learning and actually 
encourages bad writing [34]. Most recently, the federal government’s own national 
policy and practice entity, the Gonski Institute for Education, called for its “ditching” 
[35]. In a word, NAPLAN has become synonymous with bad teaching and incompe-
tent, negligent and damaging education. It is not simply that NAPLAN has achieved 
nothing worthwhile. The more damaging finding from evaluation is that it has 
become a threat to the business of sound education and has malevolently influenced 
school-based pedagogy.
NAPLAN created a stressful, needlessly competitive and, in that sense, unsafe 
environment for learning. Furthermore, it failed to impact positively on the very 
academic learning that was its principal target. It is a prime example of a pedagogi-
cal approach driven by the linear assumptions of logical positivism and ignoring the 
wisdom to be found in the philosophical and scientific perspectives outlined above. 
I now wish to summarize briefly the very different effects of a values pedagogy, 
drawing on evidence principally from the Australian Values Education Program. In 
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contrast with instrumentalist pedagogy, it emanated in what I describe as imagina-
tive pedagogy, a pedagogy that elicited the imaginative capacities essential to the 
most effective forms of learning.
5. Findings from the values pedagogy projects
Narvaez [27–29] makes the point that imaginative pedagogy is not always the 
result of spontaneous impulses. It requires both the safe environment and the guid-
ing hand of craftily planned pedagogy. It is another way of talking about the two-
sided coin of values pedagogy, the implicit side being the safe, values-filled learning 
environment and the explicit being the values-focused pedagogy.
By implicit is meant that the learning environment must be values-filled, charac-
terized by care, trust, respect and encouragement. There is any amount of research 
that has demonstrated the importance of the values-filled “ambience,” as Newmann 
[36] described it. Newmann’s work was in the area of “authentic pedagogy,” the 
pedagogy most associated with teaching that works best. Findings from his research 
were factor analyzed into five “pedagogical dynamics,” five features or characteristics 
that seemed to sum up the things most obviously associated with teaching that was 
working, achieving its goals, including academic achievement. The last and most 
important was the “ambience of care and trust.” The ambience of care and trust is the 
starting point, or sine qua non, of values pedagogy. The learning environment must be 
characterized by care and trust, positive relationships and safety and security [37–39].
The explicit side of the coin is seen in the orientation of the learning discourse 
being around values, the values inherent in curriculum content, rather than merely 
the “facts and figures” or most easily measurable features of the content. One of 
the many misconceptions about values pedagogy is that it means doing something 
additional to the standard curriculum. In fact, it does not require separation from 
the curriculum; rather, it determines the direction of the curriculum through 
becoming the pedagogy.
The content of any curriculum area tends to focus on the facts and figures 
(what Habermas calls the “empirical/analytic”) relevant to the area in question. 
Why? Because that is the most easily measured. When employed judiciously and 
seen as first step or means to a greater end, this can assist in the foundations of 
sound pedagogy. On the other hand, when it is seen as the entire step or end in 
itself, it becomes a malevolent force against sound pedagogy, instead settling for 
what I am describing as instrumentalist pedagogy. As most teachers know well, the 
more education that follows this kind of instrumentalism, the more boring it risks 
becoming, the more skewed in favor of those with retentive memories and the more 
unfair and potentially damaging it becomes to those many people who learn better 
in other ways. Additionally, the case being made above by the likes of Habermas and 
Narvaez is that, important as the facts and figures might be, the less we stimulate 
the interpretive, critical and imaginative ways of knowing, the more we stifle effica-
cious learning, and indeed the more we risk atrophying cognitive powers generally. 
In that sense, instrumentalist forms of pedagogy risk “de-educating” and stifling 
learning potential, rather than the opposite that is intended.
So, in the values pedagogy work as it functioned in the Australian program, all 
extant content was derived from the set syllabuses but instead of settling for the 
standard objectives, largely the easily measurable ones, the values inherent in the 
content became the focus, thereby stretching rather than limiting the cognitive 
powers being called on. In other words, instead of simply rolling out the content 
because it was there in the syllabus and because a measurable outcome for reporting 
was demanded by the system, lessons were begun with questions like “what value is 
Pedagogy in Basic and Higher Education - Current Developments and Challenges
8
in this content? What value for students’ important knowledge, vital understanding 
of the world into which they are moving, crucial skills and competencies for future 
work, important insights for their wellbeing and the wellbeing of those with whom 
they will form relationships? What value is it to their future personal and social 
development? What value is it for the world in general? What vital lessons about 
humanity and the Cosmos, if any, might be contained in this content?”
Evidence suggests that when these kinds of values questions were stimulating and 
determining the pedagogical direction, then the easily measurable content knowledge 
fell out anyway and, in all irony, students were actually more likely to remember the 
facts and figures at the center of such content knowledge, far beyond the measuring 
device, because of the contextual stimulation that was being applied. In Habermasian 
terms, interpretive, critical, self-reflective and imaginative knowing was being 
impelled. Data from the projects testifying to these claims include the following:
The pedagogies engage students in real-life learning, offer opportunity for real 
practice, provide safe structures for taking risks, and encourage personal reflection 
and action ([40], p. 9).
(Values pedagogy) …requires students to scrutinise questions that are difficult 
to resolve or answer, and focus on listening, thinking, challenging and changing 
viewpoints within a guided and safe environment ([40], p. 28).
The structured discussion and agreed values that govern the engagement provide 
safety and support for students as well as an expectation that correction and revi-
sion are part of the debating process. It promotes critical thinking and encourages 
an obligation to respect one’s fellow inquirers. It attempts to produce better thinkers 
and more caring members of society, who accept differences and, at the same time, 
submit conflicts to reasonable scrutiny ([40], p. 28).
The justification of such findings against Habermasian theory was summarized 
in the following way:
The frame of reference emanates from Habermas’s ‘Ways of Knowing’ and 
‘Communicative Action’ theories. In a word, it is the one who knows not only 
empirically analytically and historically hermeneutically, but self-reflectively 
who is capable of the just and empowering relationships implied in the notion of 
communicative action. In a sense, one finally comes truly to know when one knows 
oneself, and authentic knowing of self can only come through action for others, the 
practical action for change and betterment implied by praxis. Habermas provides 
the conceptual foundation for a values education that transforms educational 
practice, its actors in students and teachers, and the role of the school towards 
holistic social agency, the school that is not merely a disjoined receptacle for isolated 
academic activity, but one whose purpose is to serve and enrich the lives not only of 
its immediate inhabitants but of its community. ([39], p. 220)
In the projects that ran as part of the program, there were what were described 
as predictable, less predictable and quite unpredictable results. The predictable 
results were that students’ accrual of important personal and social values was 
strengthened and affirmed. These were predictable in the sense that any curriculum 
intervention inputs a particular discourse, words, phrases, terms and concepts even 
in the setting up phase. One then will find that discourse coming through in the 
implementation and assessment phases; it would be a fundamental sign of failure 
if that were not the case. Hence, the inspirational document, the so-called National 
9Values as the Pedagogy: Countering Instrumentalism
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.86823
Framework for Values Education in Australian Schools [41, 43], contained much 
explicit values discourse and predictably then there was a lot of similar discourse to 
be found in the evaluation phase, be it coming from teachers, university researcher 
participants, parents or the students themselves:
Everyone in the classroom exchange, teachers and students alike, became more 
conscious of trying to be respectful, trying to do their best, and trying to give others 
a fair go. We also found that by creating an environment where these values were 
constantly shaping classroom activity, student learning was improving, teachers and 
students were happier, and school was calmer. ([42], p. 120)
Moreover, there were less predictable results in the form of a plethora of dis-
course about improvements in student behavior and teacher and student wellbeing. 
Such discourse was less predictable in the sense that behavior change and wellbeing 
were not explicit target outcomes for the projects. Nonetheless, this discourse was 
commonly to be found at the evaluation phase:
… the documented behaviour of students has improved significantly, evidenced in 
vastly reduced incidents and discipline reports and suspensions. The school is … 
a “much better place to be”. Children are “well behaved”, demonstrate improved 
self-control, relate better to each other and, most significantly, share with teachers a 
common language of expectations … Other evidence of this change in the social envi-
ronment of the school is the significant rise in parental satisfaction. ([42], p. 41)
Then there was the unpredictable category of discourse around academic atten-
tion (what we eventually described as academic diligence). There was no discourse 
whatever in the set up about academic improvement yet it began appearing very 
early on in the feedback process and then continued as a persistent feature of evalu-
ation. It was initially referred to as a “surprise effect” [44] and impelled much of 
the searching out of the literature (Habermas, Narvaez, etc.) noted above in order 
to try and explain it. As they show, be it from a philosophical or neuroscientific 
perspective, a pedagogy that provides a caring, positive relational and safe learning 
environment (the implicit side of the coin), along with an approach to content that 
challenges interpretive, critical, self-reflective and imaginative pedagogy is likely 
to result in, as Narvaez would put it, the kinds of emotions that make for sound 
reasoning. In this sense, the surprise is not such a surprise. The surprise is, rather, 
that we so easily forget such fundamentals.
The issue of the unpredictable academic diligence being enhanced was one that 
required especial attention when the results were being finally evaluated and all 
claims were subject to their own testing and measuring in the project titled, Project 
to Test and Measure the Impact of Values Education on Student Effects and School 
Ambience [45]. The Executive Summary of this project summarizes the findings 
around academic diligence as an improvement factor in the following paragraph:
Thus, there was substantial quantitative and qualitative evidence suggesting that 
there were observable and measurable improvements in students’ academic dili-
gence, including increased attentiveness, a greater capacity to work independently 
as well as more cooperatively, greater care and effort being invested in schoolwork 
and students assuming more responsibility for their own learning as well as 
classroom “chores.” ([45], p. 6)
Full and complete details of how this project functioned methodologically can 
be found in Lovat and Dally [46].
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6. Discussion and application
The great Muslim scholar of the Middle Ages, Abu al-Ghazali had much to 
say about educational wisdom [47, 48]. Amidst the wisdom are words about the 
imperative for good learning to be prefaced by the instilling of imagination and the 
eliciting of wonder. These are the foundations of enduring learning, or what we 
might refer to as lifelong learning. A pedagogy focused too much on prescriptive 
teaching and persistent testing will retard progressive learning, while one centered 
on imagination and wonder can facilitate the desire to continue on the learning 
path. In many ways, Ghazali was an educational neuroscientist well before his time. 
His perspective also underlines why it is that values pedagogy contains a potential to 
lay the foundations for lifelong learning.
Indeed, there is a literature that deals precisely with the connection between 
values pedagogy and lifelong learning [49], including higher learning. As described, 
values pedagogy has potential to inflame the cognitive interests that impel those 
higher forms of learning that are essential to the kinds of critique that an informed 
populace requires of its citizenry, including the original and innovative thought 
associated with doctoral learning, as an example drawn from the parameters of 
higher education [50, 51]. This underlines the importance of such a pedagogy not 
only for maximizing learning breadth and depth in schools but also for the kind of 
learning that leads to the highest forms of intellectual achievement such as are cru-
cial to individual wholeness and to a successful, moral and harmonious citizenry.
Ghazali’s de facto motto was to ask many questions and allow the answers to 
come from the learner rather than the teacher. Above all, not to provide answers 
to questions that had not even been asked by the learner. Yet, of course, much 
education at all levels does precisely what he advised not to do. This is at the heart 
of instrumentalist pedagogy and it explains why it can do such damage to learning 
potential, especially in the long term. It can offer the kind of short term learning 
required for immediate tasks and satisfying testing requirements but it offers little 
to lifelong and/or higher learning and, furthermore, can work against it. The effects 
of such are multiple, ranging from a narrowing of the kinds of critique necessary 
to overturn age-old prejudices that lead invariably to dysfunctional societies and a 
fractious world through to a surfeit of doctoral candidates in universities who are 
less equipped than they should be in independent learning strategies. In this sense, 
instrumentalist pedagogies are formulas for retarded learning, while values peda-
gogy has the potential to lay the foundations for progressive learning.
The challenge for educational institutions at all levels is to take heed of the multi-
plicity of research that underpins the claims being made here. We live in an era that 
is blessed with the scientific understanding of learning that Ghazali did not possess. 
Yet, the irony would seem to be that he might well have understood intuitively how 
efficacious learning should proceed, regardless of the lack of evidence. On the other 
hand, many modern educational regimes have the evidence before them but ignore 
it and establish regimes of learning that are actually hostile to efficacious learning. 
The Australian NAPLAN example above is just one of any number of examples from 
school and higher education regimes that could be cited of negligent and damaging 
practice underpinned by an instrumentalist set of assumptions leading to instru-
mentalist pedagogies and a narrowing of the scope of learning.
Especially as education becomes more of a mass industry and resources become 
invariably lean, the temptation to establish perfunctory goals at the lowest level of 
what Habermas calls empirical-analytic knowing becomes particularly coercive. 
This is especially the case because the output of such knowing is the most easily 
measured. School and higher education regimes can therefore easily fool them-
selves, through the record of measurements, into thinking that good outcomes have 
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been achieved and good learning has been facilitated, where in fact the foundations 
of lifelong and higher learning have been damaged and retarded. This is a challenge 
indeed for the modern education setting, wherever and at whatever level. Granted 
these challenges, research around values pedagogy presents as a viable, inexpensive 
way forward.
7. Conclusion
The chapter has set out to debunk the kinds of instrumentalist pedagogies that 
abound in educational systems both for their conceptual weaknesses and failure 
to keep pace with the very scientific understandings on which they rest and for the 
demonstrable damage they do to young people’s learning potential. It furthermore 
proposes a values pedagogy as an approach with potential for obverse effects, one 
that ensures the right environment for learning as well as the kind of intellectual 
stimulation required for the imagination that spurs the emotions that impel sound 
reasoning. In a word, instrumentalist pedagogy survives as a tool of political 
agendas and populist media, whereas values pedagogy rests on the firmest evidence 
from philosophical and neuroscientific research about how the mind works, the 
brain functions and how efficacious learning is therefore best effected.
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